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A Review of John Rist’s “Augustine on Free 
Will and Predestination” 
Caleb Brown 
      In “Augustine on Free Will and Predestination” John Rist clearly states what he 
wants to add to the discussion on Augustine’s doctrine of free will and 
predestination: “It is my contention that the synthesis I shall attempt to present, if 
correct, negates other syntheses, and that all Augustinian texts which are relevant 
to the subject-matter are in harmony with it.”1 Rist explicitly rejects any approach 
to understanding Augustine’s position on free will (what could be a purely 
philosophical topic) without considering his position on predestination (a 
theological topic). Augustine does not separate philosophy and theology, so Rist 
rejects attempting to understand Augustine’s philosophical and theological stances 
separately.2  
     In this paper I seek to summarize and critique John Rist’s article “Augustine on 
Free Will and Predestination.”3 In my critique I focus on two points where Rist 
                                                          
1 John M. Rist, "Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," The Journal of Theological 
Studies 20, no. 2 (October 1969): 421, accessed April 9, 2016,  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23960142. 
2 Ibid., 420-421. 
3 This review will treat only the body of Rist’s article, not the appendix. 
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finds Augustine’s position lacking. These points are: 1) Augustine’s lack of an 
account of how God acts justly in election and 2) Augustine’s demeaning of man 
to the level of a “puppet.” I attempt to demonstrate that Rist’s criticisms are rebutted 
by extending Augustine’s teachings of, respectively, 1) causality and the will and 
2) the solidarity of humanity with Adam. My aim is not to prove that Augustine’s 
articulation of free will and God’s predestination is the correct one, but only that 
Augustine’s position can withstand the criticisms Rist brings against it. 
Rist’s Definitions 
      Rist notes that Augustine uses several terms differently than they are often used 
today and defines these terms according to Augustine’s usage. While these 
definitions occur throughout the article, it is most helpful to deal with them up front. 
Rist states that when Augustine uses voluntas he means “moral self” or “moral 
personality.” By this Augustine does not mean a faculty of the person, but the 
person herself.4  A person cannot be separated from her will, so there is no 
“compelling to will.”5 Because she is inseparable from her will, if she is forced to 
do something, it is not because her will has been manipulated against her but 
because her will has been overpowered. 
                                                          
4 Ibid., 421. 
5 Ibid., 422. 
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     When Augustine uses liber as in liber voluntas or liber arbitrium he intends to 
signify responsibility, not that fallen man can refrain from doing evil.6 He means 
only that when we act, we, ourselves, choose—we do not struggle against an 
outside power only to be overcome by it. Habits and sin nature direct us, yet we are 
free when we act. Finally, when Augustine speaks of predestination he means: 
“foreknowledge and ‘pre-paration’ by God of those acts of kindness . . . by which 
those who are saved are saved.”7 Moreover, Augustine holds that God only 
predestines to salvation, not to damnation. Passages where Augustine speaks of 
predestination to death or punishment do not use the same sense of the word. In 
these contexts “predestination” signifies a passive attitude on God’s part, whereas 
when God predestines to salvation He affirmatively chooses. 
Augustine’s Conception of Free Choice: The Ability to do Right 
     According to Rist, Augustine holds that, unless aided by God, post-fall humans 
will not choose right. Man belongs to one of two camps, caritas or cupiditas. There 
is no middle ground, no participation in both at once. A person belongs to and is 
controlled by either one or the other. Thus, freedom is not the ability to do otherwise 
than one does but is “obedience to God, the choice and performance of good works 
under the guidance of God’s grace. It is freedom from the necessity of sin.”8 
                                                          
6 Ibid., 425. 
7 Ibid., 427. 
8 Ibid., 424. 
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Moreover, without the grace of God, there is no hope of moving from cupiditas to 
caritas.9 This grace of God is not based on any past, present, or future merit of the 
individual who receives it. Rist notes that, even though Augustine portrays 
humanity as dependent on God for salvation, there is still the possibility that he 
allows humanity autonomy in relation to God in some areas such as non-salvific 
good. If Augustine does not teach that humanity has some autonomy from God, 
Rist holds that Augustine will have reduced people to mere “puppets.”10 
Autonomy in Regard to Doing Good: It does not Exist 
     As seen above, when Augustine says that humans are free, he means that they 
are responsible, not that they can do any good apart from God. God’s continued, 
active assistance is necessary for a person to do good, even after that person has 
been freed from sin—placed in the caritas camp. God’s grace must be continually 
applied for a person to act in a God-honoring manner. Rist sees Augustine’s 
commitment to this doctrine as especially demonstrated in his discussion of the 
sinlessness of Mary. Augustine holds that Mary was not once and for all made 
sinless, but, in an extraordinary and unparalleled working of God’s grace, was 
continually sustained in righteousness.11 Even then, like everyone else, only after 
death did Mary reach a point where sin was an impossibility.  
                                                          
9 Ibid., 425. 
10 Ibid., 425. 
11 Ibid., 427. 
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The Difference Between Adam’s Power of Choice and Current 
Humans’ Power of Choice 
     Augustine holds that Adam had the knowledge, power, and all other things 
necessary to either accept or reject God’s grace. As Adam accepted God’s grace, 
he was maintained in righteousness. If he rejected it, he fell into sin. Unfallen Adam 
was “free from moral evil, though necessarily possessed of the ontological 
weakness that is the lot of all that is both free and created.”12 Rist holds that 
determining if any of Adam’s original choice still remains to humans is important 
to understanding Augustine’s doctrine of free will and predestination. Rist gives 
the following account of Augustine’s view of the fall of Adam: When Adam fell, 
all fell.13 In this Fall, both Adam’s nature and the nature of all of humanity was 
scarred and “vitiated.”14 Humans are no longer capable of a choice like Adam’s. 
However, the “last vestiges”15 of Adam’s original nature do remain in people. The 
question is, what do these vestiges enable humans to do? How much of Adam’s 
capability of free choice do those vestiges enable in the present humanity? 
     Do these vestiges allow humans any opportunity to autonomously accept or 
reject God’s grace? Rist has already discussed Augustine’s position that humans 
                                                          
12 Ibid., 434. 
13 Ibid., 431. 
14 Ibid., 432. 
15 Ibid. 
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cannot be saved apart from God’s grace, and that, once saved, they cannot do good 
apart from God’s grace. So the good people do is causally determined by God’s 
grace. But what about that grace itself? Do humans have the power to do otherwise 
in their relationship to God’s grace? As Rist notes, Augustine’s metaphysical “last 
vestiges”16 teaching allows for this possibility. According to Rist, Augustine rejects 
this possibility in his letter to Simplicianus where he holds to an extremely difficult 
interpretation of the passage: “many are called, but few chosen.”17 As Rist points 
out, the plain reading of the passage is that a person can reject God’s salvific grace, 
but Augustine employs convoluted distinctions to demonstrate that this passage is 
in accord with the idea that all to whom God offers His grace accept it and are 
saved. Rist concludes, “Augustine argues . . . salvation is independent of man’s 
fallen will; it is a matter of God’s omnipotence.”18 
Rist’s Reaction 
     Rist concludes that Augustine’s position is that “fallen man is totally subject to 
the acts of God.”19 He criticizes Augustine’s position by pointing out that Augustine 
cannot explain why God selects those he elects. Rist argues that, although this is a 
complex issue, Augustine cannot be excused on grounds of complexity because he 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 436. 
18 Ibid., 437. 
19 Ibid., 438. 
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excels at formulating speculative solutions to complex doctrines (such as the 
Trinity). Rist argues that Augustine’s lack of an explanation leaves God vulnerable 
to the charge of injustice.20 
     Rist writes that, according to Augustine, “Man can only be bound to the good 
by a new act of God. And this act of God can only occur at the sacrifice of one of 
the greatest gifts given to Adam, namely his ultimate autonomy on the matter of 
moral choice.”21 Rist reacts strongly against this teaching, which he holds renders 
men to be on the level of “puppets.”22 He sympathizes with Augustine only by 
recognizing that Augustine sees the security of a scenario based on God’s 
involvement through efficacious grace as better than the contingency of one based 
on Adam’s choice. In his conclusion Rist also notes that Augustine does not believe 
that Adam had a real choice. His metaphysical derivation from nothingness made 
his fall an “irresistible phenomena.”23 
Critique of Rist’s Criticism Regarding Election and God’s Justice 
     Rist argues that Augustine’s lack of an explanation for why God chooses to elect 
those he does leaves God liable to charges of injustice. This charge does not take 
into account Augustine’s approach to the nature of the will. Augustine’s doctrine 
                                                          
20 Ibid., 440. 
21 Ibid., 442. 
22 Ibid, 441. 
23 Ibid., 442. 
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of God’s election of certain individuals is consistent with his approach to the will, 
whether human or divine. Rist’s own discussion of Augustine’s doctrine of the will 
acknowledges that Augustine holds that there is no final cause of the will outside 
of itself.24 Speaking of Adam and Eve’s choice, Bonnie Kent writes, “The only 
explanation Augustine can conceive is that their sin arose from an evil will which 
itself had no prior or external cause.”25 Augustine extends this doctrine on the 
divine level: “Thus if they were to say ‘What determined God to make heaven and 
earth?’ one should respond to them that those who desire to become acquainted 
with God’s will should first learn about the power of the human will. For they seek 
to know the causes of God’s will when God’s will itself is the cause of all the things 
there are.”26 Augustine’s doctrine of the will’s initial or self-causality as a sort of 
“unmoved mover” is not an acquiescence to mystery in the Divine Nature, but 
rather a carefully reasoned and consistent application of his broader theory of will. 
     Of course, the fear is that, without justification, God’s choices will be arbitrary 
and thus unjust. This fear conflates “unjustified” and “unjust.” For Augustine, the 
                                                          
24 Rist, 423. 
25 Bonnie Kent, “Augustine’s Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. Eleonore 
Stump and Norman Kretzmann (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 222. 
26 Qtd. in: William Mann, “Augustine on Evil and Original Sin,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (New York, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 41. 
Brown 8 
 
Quaerens Deum  Spring 2016     Volume 2     Issue 1 
core of justice is “right relationship.”27 It is a consistent biblical pattern that God’s 
choices are not justified by any merit in the individual, whether it be the selection 
of Jacob, the people of Israel, or the elect. It seems possible to argue that God’s 
choices are just not only in their lack of a justification, but even that their lack of a 
justification is important to their justness. God’s place, as the sovereign, 
transcendent ruler is one of complete authority. Would it be just for a person to be 
constrained in the use of his household dishes by any sort of obligation to them? 
Certainly this would not be a right relationship. Similarly, it would be an improper 
relationship for God to be constrained in His plans for His creation by anything 
other than His own nature.28 
Critique of Rist’s Position that Augustine Renders Humans as 
“Puppets” 
     Two general observations are in order. First, while Rist does not make this 
explicit, he appears to assume that, “an agent acts with free will, or is morally 
responsible for an act, only if he could have done otherwise.”29 Second, Rist 
                                                          
27 Mary T. Clark, "Human Persons and the Foundation of Justice and Rights," Cogito 1 (March 
1983): 120, accessed April 13, 2016, Philosopher's Index with Full Text. 
28 Note: I have not found evidence that Augustine himself fully expressed this position. My point 
here is only that Augustine’s system can be extended to meet Rist’s objection, not that Augustine 
himself extended his system to this point. 
29 Eleonore stump, “Augustine on Free Will,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine ed. 
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzman, (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 125. 
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acknowledges in his opening remarks that, for Augustine, “‘Freedom’ . . . did not 
carry the same emotional overtones as those with which we are familiar.”30 Despite 
this acknowledgment, Rist proceeds to speak disparagingly of Augustine for 
reducing people to puppets—an approach which seems to indicate that Rist is 
applying his modern valuation of freedom to the discussion. Thus, Rist engages 
Augustine on Rist’s terms, not Augustine’s, and so Augustine’s position is 
disadvantaged. 
     A more substantive issue with Rist’s critique of Augustine on free will is its 
failure to account for the significance of Augustine’s conception of corporate 
solidarity in Adam. My argument here will rely on Eleonore Stump’s contention 
that an agent can still act in-deterministically although it is not possible for him to 
act otherwise than he does. First, I will examine how Augustine argues against the 
Pelagians that sinful actions do corrupt the will. Second, I will argue that 
Augustine’s doctrine of corporate solidarity with Adam allows individual humans 
to maintain ultimate freedom. 
     Warfield describes the Pelagian position on the will’s corruptibility thus: “No 
corruption of nature, even by growing habit, is really allowed.”31 “Pelagius still 
asserted our continuous possession of ‘a free will which is unimpaired for sinning 
                                                          
30 Rist, “Augustine on Free will and Predestination,” 421. 
31 Benjamin Warfield, Studies in Tertullian and Augustine (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1970), 295. 
Brown 10 
 
Quaerens Deum  Spring 2016     Volume 2     Issue 1 
and for not sinning.’”32 Julian also argued, “Our free will is just as full after sins as 
it was before sins.”33 Augustine explicitly rejects this position: “Augustine replies 
that this destroys the Savior’s work—for how can He save from sins if sins do not 
corrupt?”34 He sees the Pelagian position as conflicting directly will biblical 
passages such as Romans 1.35 
     From this discussion it is apparent that Augustine holds that one’s previous 
sinful choices could limit one’s ability to choose rightly in the present. Stump 
proposes that “an agent acts with free will or is morally responsible for an act, only 
if the act is not ultimately causally determined by anything outside the agent.”36 
This criterion allows for a scenario in which an individual could not do anything 
other than what he does but still be free. While an individual’s impaired will may 
constrain him to choose evil in a given instance, it is possible that only he himself 
is responsible for the impaired state of his will.  
     Augustine’s doctrine of corporate solidarity with Adam allows the condition of 
ultimate responsibility to be met for all of humanity. From De Peccatorum Meritis 
Et Remissione Et De Baptismo Parvulorum book three, chapter 14: 
                                                          
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 330. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Stump, “Augustine on Free Will,” 128. 
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Nor, indeed, are those sins of infancy so said to be another’s, as if they did 
not belong to the infants at all, inasmuch as all then sinned in Adam, when 
in his nature, by virtue of that innate power whereby he was able to produce 
them, they were all as yet the one Adam; but they are called another’s, 
because as yet they were not living their own lives, but the life of the one 
man contained whatsoever was in his future posterity.37 
 
According to Augustine, Adam’s sin was not external to the rest of humanity. The 
idea of Adam’s sin as his and not the rest of humanity’s, both corporately and 
individually, is foreign to Augustine. 
     Stump’s analogy of the sci-fi smoking device provides a useful tool for 
understanding how a person can be free although bound by sinful nature to be 
wholly dependent on God. In Stump’s analogy there is a smoker who, on his own, 
is wholly incapable of refraining from smoking. But this smoker can choose to put 
on a device, and if he does he will have an effective first-order will to refrain from 
smoking. Stump argues that, while the smoker’s first order will is caused by the 
device, he is actually still free because the ultimate cause of his will is his decision 
to use the device.38 In the context of the doctrine of corporate solidarity and free 
choice, Adam’s sin, which is the sin of all humanity, both corporately and 
individually, takes the place of the device. While this sin constrains human will, the 
                                                          
37 Augustine,"0354-0430 – Augustinus – De Peccatorum Meritis Et Remissione Et De Baptismo 
Parvulorum," Documenta Catholica Omnia. December 6, 2011. Accessed April 13, 2016. 
http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/0354-
0430,_Augustinus,_De_Peccatorum_Meritis_Et_Remissione_Et_De_Baptismo_Parvulorum_[Sch
aff],_EN.pdf,  214. 
38 Stump, “Augustine on Free Will.” 
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cause of this sin is free will, so the constrained will is ultimately caused by a free 
choice of will. Thus, ultimately, there is nothing external which causally determines 
the state of humanity and the decisions, and constraints on decisions, which flow 
from that state.  
     It does appear to be true that Augustine portrays humanity as totally dependent 
on God both for salvation and for post-salvific good. Moreover, it seems clear that 
he did not hold that humanity could refuse God’s grace. But Rist’s assertions that 
Augustine reduces humanity to the level of puppets do not account appropriately 
for the fact that each human’s state of dependency is of his own making.39 
Conclusion 
     John Rist treats Augustine with honesty. When is as authoritative as Augustine, 
the temptation to manipulate his writings into saying things which agree with one’s 
own position is strong. Rist resists this temptation, even concluding that Augustine 
holds a position on free will and predestination which Rist finds highly 
objectionable.  
                                                          
39 At the end of his article, Rist does mention in passing that Augustine does not hold that Adam 
was actually “free” in Rist’s sense of the word—that Adam’s fall was irresistible. However, he 
does not provide any justification for this statement. He gives no references to Augustine’s 
writings in which Augustine states this. It is true that Augustine holds that pride is an inherent 
liability (see Rist, “Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,” 441) but this is very different 
from asserting that Adam’s fall was inevitable. Moreover, this assertion conflicts with other 
statements Rist makes which are clearly derived from Augustine (Ibid., 430). Thus, this statement 
will be passed over and no attempt will be made to integrate it into my discussion. 
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     But in his objections to Augustine’s position, Rist does not do justice to the 
whole system of Augustine’s thought. First, he imposes his own criteria and value 
for freedom upon Augustine (criteria and value which clearly conflict with 
Augustine’s own) without ever discussing which criteria and values are correct. 
Second, he conflates an unjustified decision with an unjust decision, failing to 
recognize that Augustine could see God’s unjustified (at least by any human 
attribute) selection of persons to salvation as the right relationship between God 
and humanity. Finally, he does not give full weight to the catholic nature of 
Augustine’s doctrine of the corporate solidarity of humanity in Adam. He takes the 
doctrine of humanity’s participation in the sin of Adam in the sense of an external 
effect, whereas Augustine characterizes it as an internal decision. 
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